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ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH THE LENS
OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION THEORY:
TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL
David B. Lipsky* and Ariel C. Avgar**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS symposium is another demonstration that online dispute resolution
S"ODR") is receiving growing interest in the dispute resolution and legal
arenas. Much of the literature published to date highlights the great promise
offered by ODR processes and its unique boundaryless cyber characteristics.
2
Nevertheless, even proponents recognize that, as with any emerging
phenomenon, there are inevitable pitfalls and challenges to consider when
evaluating ODR's potential societal contribution in both general and specific
ODR procedures. 3  As with traditional dispute resolution procedures, ODR
researchers have been attempting to develop a clear and measurable set of criteria
by which to evaluate ODR processes and outcomes.4
We believe that existing efforts to evaluate and analyze ODR fall short in
several respects. Specifically, this article rests on three premises. First, the
majority of the criteria used to evaluate ODR are atheoretical. Much of the
evaluation of ODR is developed in the form of a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of ODR compared to dispute resolution in the physical world.
Although assessing ODR's advantages and disadvantages is obviously an
* David B. Lipsky is the Anne Evans Estabrook Professor of Dispute Resolution in the
School of Industrial and Labor Relations and Director of the Institute on Conflict Resolution at
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
** Ariel C. Avgar is a research associate with the Institute on Conflict Resolution and a Ph.D.
candidate at Cornell University.
1. For an additional indication of the growing interest in ODR among dispute resolution
researchers and practitioners, see Colloquy: The Human Face of Online Dispute Resolution, 23
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 333 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Joseph Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute Resolution: An
Assessment of Cyber-Mediation Websites, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2003), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0004.html.
3. See id. See also Julia Homle, Online Dispute Resolution: The Emperor's New Clothes?,
17 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 27 (2003); George H. Friedman, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Emerging Online Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 695 (1997).
4. For a general discussion regarding the evaluation of traditional conflict management
systems and some of the challenges associated with this process, see DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL.,
EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 263-95 (2003).
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important endeavor, we believe that such efforts would be strengthened if they
were founded on solid theoretical frameworks.
Second, we maintain that in evaluating ODR it is imperative that key elements
of negotiation and dispute resolution processes be incorporated into the
evaluation scheme.5 Thus, we propose that the evaluation framework used for
ODR be grounded in the rich and long-standing tradition of negotiation theory.
One of the limitations of the existing literature on ODR is the lack of a
theoretical framework and empirical evidence based on solid research. This
leads to a never-ending debate between those who believe ODR is the next great
revolution in dispute resolution 6 and those who believe ODR will undermine the
dispute resolution process.7 By shifting the discussion from an ad hoc debate of
its merits and demerits to one that is grounded in negotiation theory, ODR
scholarship stands to gain a more fine-grained analysis of and an expanded set of
criteria by which to evaluate ODR's benefits and drawbacks.
Third, ODR is not a single phenomenon but in fact an umbrella term for a wide
array of dispute resolution procedures and technological tools. Moreover, ODR,
in its varied forms, is used to resolve a variety of disputes including those that
originate online as well as offline. ODR evaluation criteria must take this
variation into account and assess the manner in which different online tools and
procedures influence resolution processes and outcomes for different categories
of disputes. Here, too, we believe that this variation should be incorporated into
an evaluation framework that is based on negotiation theory.
In this article we apply negotiation and bargaining theory to the analysis of
online dispute resolution. Our principal objective is to develop testable
hypotheses based on negotiation theory that can be used in ODR research. We
have not conducted the research necessary to test the hypotheses we develop;
however, in a later section of the article we suggest a possible methodology for
doing so. There is a vast literature on negotiation and bargaining theory. For
the purposes of this article, we realized at the outset that we could only use a
small part of that literature in developing a model that might be suitable for
empirical testing. We decided to use the "behavioral" theory of negotiation
developed by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which was initially
5. For a notable exception to the lack of attention given to issues of process, see Ethan Katsh
et al., E-Commerce, E-Disputes, and E-Dispute Resolution: In the Shadow of "eBay Law," 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL. 705, 722 (2000), and Ethan Katsh, Bringing Online Dispute Resolution
to Virtual Worlds: Creating Processes through Code, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 271 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Richard Michael Victorio, Internet Dispute Resolution (IDR): Bringing ADR into
the 21st Century, 1 PEPP. DisP. REs. L.J. 279 (2001); Alejandro E. Almaguer & Roland W.
Baggiotte III, Shaping Legal Frontiers: Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RES. 711 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Are We Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace?, 1998 BYU L. REv.
1305. It is interesting to note that Eisen's perspective increasingly seems to represent the minority
view of ODR. Most of the ODR literature holds that ODR possesses great promise for dispute
resolution. One of our motivations in contending that an integrated framework is needed for the
evaluation and analysis of ODR stems from our belief that ODR will benefit from a more complete
and balanced understanding of how it operates.
8. Id. at 1319n.65.
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formulated in the 1960s.9  This theory has stood the test of time. Initially
developed to explain union-management negotiations, it has proven useful in
analyzing a wide variety of disputes and conflict situations.10 In constructing
their theory, Walton and McKersie built on the contributions and work of many
previous bargaining theorists including economists, sociologists, game theorists,
and industrial relations scholars. In this article, we have incorporated a
consideration of the foundations on which their theory was based. In the
concluding section of the article we discuss briefly how other negotiation and
bargaining theories might be applied to the analysis of ODR.
We hope our work will stimulate others to analyze ODR theoretically.
Clearly, bargaining and negotiation theory is not the only theory researchers can
use to construct analytical models and testable hypotheses; for example,
communication theory is a fertile source for model building." A key assumption
underlying our hypothesis-building exercise is that there are discernible and
meaningful differences between the online and the physical, face-to-face world.
We acknowledge that these differences may be waning and that the shibboleths
conventionally associated with the online world may not have the significance
they did a few years ago.12
II. STANDARD CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING ODR
In this section we review the standard criteria that have been used to evaluate
ODR. Although we maintain in this articler that negotiation theory should be
used to develop new criteria for evaluating ODR, the use of existing criteria to
assess the advantages and disadvantages of ODR is a crucial building block upon
which theory can be used to advance our understanding. In an effort to facilitate
the discussion, we have grouped the existing criteria into six categories. '3
A. Cost Reduction Criteria
When alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") started to gain popularity in the
United States in the 1970s, one of the dominant rationales for shifting from the
9. Id. at n.66.
10. Id. at 1320-21 nn.70-74.
11. See, e.g., Nicole Gabrielle Kravec, Dogmas of Online Dispute Resolution, 38 U. TOL. L.
REv. 125 (2006).
12. See generally David Allen Larson, Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution (TMDR): A
New Paradigm for ADR, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 629 (2006). Larson points out that some
of the differences that exist between the online and face-to-face worlds are perceived to exist by an
older generation that did not grow up using current technologies and are likely to be much less
significant when the current generation of young people reaches maturity. "In fact, a very real
generational disconnect is developing between many current dispute resolvers, including
commentators and theorists, and the children who are learning to live their lives through technology
mediated communications.... [M]illions of children are learning the skills necessary to survive in a
world where technology is ubiquitous." Id. at 630.
13. It is important to note that many of these criteria are clearly interrelated and are separated
here for conceptual purposes.
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conventional dispute resolution forums, such as the court system and regulatory
commissions, was the potential saving of money and time.14  Similarly, an
important argument in favor of ODR is its potential to reduce the costs associated
with resolving disputes.' 5 The savings in time, the elimination of the need to
travel, the greater ease of exchanging information, and the reduction in other
logistical expenses are all claimed to make ODR a preferable dispute resolution
forum for a growing population of disputes.16  Thus, most ODR advocates
maintain that cost reduction is a dominant criterion that should be used to
measure the effectiveness of ODR. Are disputes resolved faster in online forums
than they would be in face-to-face settings? When taking technological expenses
into consideration, to what degree does the use of online forums result in
monetary savings for the disputants? Does the reduction in costs vary across
different types of disputes? These are the type of questions that are at the heart
of cost reduction criteria for evaluating ODR.
B. Legal and Regulatory Criteria
Many of the purported advantages of ODR stem from its ability to transcend
geographical, social, and cultural boundaries.' 7 But these very characteristics of
ODR raise a number of legal challenges. For example, legal scholars wrestle
with the implications that cyberspace as a dispute resolution arena has on
questions of jurisdiction and applicable laws. 18 The lack of strict jurisdictional
rules and regulations allows ODR to provide a fast and less costly alternative to
both litigation and traditional ADR. In addition, the absence of clearly defined
laws and regulations allows the parties to develop rules and norms that are more
suitable for their communities and modes of interaction.' 9 However, as the use of
ODR increases and expands into a wider array of dispute categories, the absence
14. For a discussion of the economic incentives for the use of ADR, see LIPSKY ET AL., supra
note 4, at 101-05.
15. See, e.g., ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING
CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 26 (2001); Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Developing an Online
Dispute Resolution Environment: Dialogue Tools and Negotiation Support Systems in a Three-Step
Model, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 287, 297 (2005); Lan Q. Hang, Online Dispute Resolution
Systems: The Future of Cyberspace Law, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 837, 855 (2001).
16. For a discussion regarding ODR efficiencies as compared to offiine procedures, see Katsh
et al., supra note 5, at 722.
17. For a discussion of the "boundaryless" nature of ODR, see Robert C. Bordone, Electronic
Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 175, 181 (1998).
18. For a general review of jurisdictional and other legal implications of the use of ODR, see
Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise and
Challenge of Online Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 985 (2001); Eugene Clark et al.,
Online Dispute Resolution: Present Realities, Pressing Problems and Future Prospects, 17 INT'L
REv. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 7, 17 (2003).
19. See, e.g., E. Casey Lide, ADR and Cyberspace: The Role ofAlternative Dispute Resolution
in Online Commerce, Intellectual Property and Defamation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 193,
201 (1996); Hang, supra note 15, at 856.
[Vol. 38
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of regulations and the existence of jurisdictional ambiguities may create
complications that hinder its popularity and functionality.20
Compliance with and enforcement of agreements reached online are additional
concerns that stem from the very nature of ODR.21 How does a disputant ensure
compliance with and enforcement of a facilitated settlement reached online? If
enforcement is not guaranteed online, does ODR run the risk of becoming the
hub for sterile agreements? One of the most frequently expressed concerns about
ODR is the ability of parties to reach agreements online that are enforceable and
free from complications that may arise out of the absence of clearly defined
jurisdictional lines.
C. Voice and Access to Justice Criteria
Access to justice and the ability to exercise a meaningful voice have also
played an important role in advocates' arguments supporting both traditional and
online ADR. ODR advocates point to the Internet's enormous potential for
providing millions of individuals worldwide with access to a dispute resolution
process-individuals who may not otherwise have had access to any means of
settling their disputes.23 Since many of the disputes that are settled through ODR
mechanisms stem from online commerce, some argue that providing dispute
resolution in a form compatible to the online transaction increases consumer
voice. Giving consumers greater voice helps to assure a more level playing field
between the individual consumer and the corporations with which they do
business.24
Others acknowledge that ODR may be increasing access to justice for
individuals who have the appropriate technological and knowledge-based
capabilities; unfortunately many individuals, especially those who are older or
have low incomes, lack access to both the technology and the knowledge needed
to use ODR.25 Evaluating ODR-both in terms of the effectiveness of specific
ODR sites and ODR's larger implications for society-requires an accounting of
the degree to which individuals are assured both access to and voice in ODR's
processes and procedures.
20. See Teitz, supra note 18, at 990; Katsh et al., supra note 5, at 707-08.
21. Hang, supra note 15, at 860.
22. For a discussion of the advantages of traditional workplace arbitration in providing access
to justice for parties that are traditionally excluded from the judicial system, see generally Samuel
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559 (2001).
23. See, e.g., KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 10, 30; Teitz, supra note 18, at 990.
24. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice? A Market Incentive
Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and
Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 7 (2002).
25. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 713; Julia R. Gordon, Legal Services and the Digital Divide,
12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 809, 811-14 (2002).
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D. Ethical, Fairness, and Balance-of-Power Criteria
Some of the key criteria used to evaluate any dispute resolution procedure are
those that are used to assess whether the procedure provides necessary due-
process safeguards and guarantees a fair and ethically sound process. Many
critics have raised questions regarding the protections in traditional ADR
provided to complaining parties. Similar concerns have been raised about
ODR; to some extent the characteristics of ODR complicate the task of providing
fair procedures. For example, concerns regarding the confidentiality of the
process are clearly amplified by the nature of the ODR process and the existence
of a perpetual "paper trail., 27 An additional concern is the close link between
some online commercial enterprises, such as eBay, and related online dispute
resolution websites, such as SquareTrade. 28  Just as ethical and procedural
concerns are raised about employer-promulgated dispute resolution systems, in
ODR there is also a need to assess whether dispute resolution services closely
linked to one of the parties can provide an unbiased process for all disputants.
Katsh, Rifkin, and Gaitenby address issues of power imbalances in the use of
ODR by referring to the dispute resolution process provided to consumers by
eBay as "ADR in the shadow of eBay law." PO The authors point to the greater
power held by entities such as eBay, which are to a large extent the legislators of
the "laws" that regulate the disputing parties.3' In developing ethical and fairness
criteria, ODR research should be informed by the persistent debates around these
issues in ADR literature.
E. Communications and Information-Processing Criteria
In reality, ODR consists of a variety of sophisticated means by which parties
can communicate with each other, exchange information, and attempt to resolve
disputes. ODR advocates maintain that providing disputing parties with enhanced
communications and information-processing abilities improves the dispute
resolution process. 32 Some have argued, however, that the lack of face-to-face
26. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996); Arnold M. Zack,
Agreements to Arbitrate and the Waiver of Rights Under Employment Law, in EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-94 (Adrienne E.
Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1 st ed. 1999).
27. For a discussion regarding the degree to which rules of confidentiality may differ when
using an Internet-based dispute resolution provider, see Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's
Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm for Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
253 (2006).
28. See SquareTrade, Solve Problems with Online Dispute Resolution (ODR),
http://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/odr/overview-odr.jsp (follow "Learn More" hyperlink) (last
visited Aug. 25, 2006).
29. See Clark et al., supra note 18, at 21.
30. Katsh et al., supra note 5, at 727-33.
31. Id. at 731.
32. See Katsh, supra note 5, at 277.
[Vol. 38
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interactions renders these improvements in communications futile because they
believe the very essence of communications-the ability to express emotions or
to see facial expressions-has been stricken from the interaction.3  ODR
supporters have grown accustomed to these types of criticisms and have
countered them by providing empirical evidence for the power of online
communications. This evidence fosters the essential components of dispute
resolution, such as trust, empathy, and respect.34
Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the common criteria used to assess
ODR is its ability to facilitate effective communication and information
processing by disputing parties. Does ODR allow for appropriate
communications between disputing parties? Is this communication avenue
superior or inferior to traditional face-to-face methods? Currently, these are the
types of questions ODR researchers are most interested in addressing.
As we will maintain below, negotiation theory indicates that assessing the
effectiveness of communications between the parties in ODR requires that due
account be taken of the precise nature of the dispute. For example, we will argue
that communication and information sharing between disputants is strongly
influenced by whether a dispute is principally distributive or integrative in nature,
that is, on whether their dispute is more like a zero-sum game or a non-zero-sum
game. Not only the nature of the dispute but also the procedure and the
technology used to resolve the dispute can be expected to have a great deal of
influence on the kind of communication the parties will think is appropriate.
F. Technological Criteria
ODR is, by its very nature, the product of technological advances that have
transformed individuals' abilities to communicate and interact without face-to-
face contact. The technological advances that make ODR possible are constantly
improved, and new tools are created.35 Thus, it is essential that an evaluation of
ODR in general as well as of particular ODR websites address the implications of
existing and emerging technologies. How user-friendly are these technologies?
How costly is the use of a particular technology? In evaluating ODR, it is also
important to take into account the degree to which technology plays a role in the
dispute resolution process. In some forms of ODR, technology merely provides
logistical assistance to the disputing parties. In other forms, especially those
using cutting-edge technologies, technology plays a more central role in the
process. In addition, one of the most fascinating questions receiving literary
33. See Eisen, supra note 7, at 1311.
34. For an in-depth discussion of the communication power of online technologies, see Larson,
supra note 12, at 629-49. See also Katsh, supra note 5, at 285-86.
35. For a detailed discussion regarding the technological strides taken in this realm, see
generally Larson, supra note 12.
Fall 2006]
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attention is the manner in which technological tools influence the dispute
resolution process itself.
36
In a recent article, law professor Rabinovich-Einy assesses the effects of the
technologies and procedures offered by SquareTrade, one of the most active
ODR sites, on the mediation process. She finds that using online technologies
has created a means of enhancing the mediation process by adjusting the
traditional tension between accountability and flexibility.37 We find this line of
research especially fruitful and believe that it is precisely this type of ODR
assessment that will illuminate not only the outcomes associated with ODR
procedures but also the interaction between technology and process.
III. FOUR CRITICAL DIMENSIONS OF ODR
An essential building block in our effort to provide a theoretical framework for
ODR assessment is the recognition of the critical dimensions distinguishing ODR
from conventional face-to-face dispute resolution. These dimensions also
distinguish one form of ODR from another. We will discuss four of these
dimensions: the type of technology (e.g., synchronous or asynchronous), the
origins of the dispute (online or offline), the type of ODR procedure used to
resolve the dispute (automated or facilitated), and the ADR procedure used (e.g.,
mediation or arbitration). We argue that using theory to develop hypotheses for
evaluating ODR requires accounting for variation in these core dimensions.
A. The Type of Technology
There are at least two types of technologies that persons need to consider in
building an analytical model of ODR. Synchronous technologies allow for
communication between disputing parties in real time. Asynchronous
technologies provide participants with the capacity to store and retrieve data or
material.38 There has been considerable discussion about the "convergence" of
these two types of technology. Increasingly, convergence means that
synchronous and asynchronous technologies are used simultaneously, and
"blended" solutions often combine synchronous techniques (e.g., video
teleconferencing), asynchronous techniques (e.g., websites and e-mail), and face-
to-face interactions.3 Even though convergence may ultimately mean that a user
36. For a typology on the role technology plays in ODR, see Mohamed Wahab, The Global
Information Society and Online Dispute Resolution: A New Dawn for Dispute Resolution, 21 J.
INT'L ARB. 168 (2004).
37. See generally Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 27. For an additional example of how
technology might alter the actual dispute resolution process, see Katsh, supra note 5, at 281.
38. Kevin Oakes, E-Learning: Synching Up with Virtual Classrooms, T&D (Tech. & Dev.),
Sept. 2002, at 57.
39. For a sampling of sources on convergence and blended solutions, see generally THE
HANDBOOK OF BLENDED LEARNING: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, LOCAL DESIGNS (Curtis J. Bonk et al.
eds., 2006); RICHARD E. MAYER, MULTIMEDIA LEARNING (2001); NIGEL CHAPMAN & JENNY
CHAPMAN, DIGITAL MULTIMEDIA (2d ed. 2004); JOSH BERSN, THE BLENDED LEARNING BOOK:
BEST PRACTICES, PROVEN METHODOLOGIES, AND LESSONS LEARNED (2004); DAVID B. YOFFI,
[Vol. 38
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enjoys a seamless interface across technologies, at the moment the distinction
between synchronous and asynchronous technologies still has significant
practical relevance.
Telephonic communication is one obvious example of electronic
communication that is typically done in real time; note that voicemail is a form of
telephonic communication that is not done in real time and is therefore
asynchronous. Perhaps a more interesting synchronous technology is video-
conferencing or video teleconferencing ("VTC"). VTC employs real-time
picture and audio transmission and allows individuals in two or more locations to
both hear and see each other simultaneously. The availability of VTC dates to
the invention of television and the development of closed-circuit television
systems. In earlier years, VTC using analog technology was very expensive.
The use of ordinary telephone networks for transmission resulted in poor picture
quality and limited its widespread adoption. With the adoption of digital
technology in the 1980s, the diffusion of VTC outside the broadcasting industry
began in earnest. Even then, however, the use of VTC was limited by the lack of
adequate bandwidth and efficient video compression techniques. Over time, the
technology has steadily improved, and the cost of investing in units has steadily
declined. "Video teleconference systems throughout the 1990s rapidly evolved
from highly expensive proprietary equipment, software and network
requirements to [a] standards-based technology that is readily available to the
general public at reasonable cost. '40  The videoconferencing technology now
available allows broadcast-quality communication between parties at multiple
sites. For example at the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell,
distance learning courses using videoconferencing technology have regularly
been conducted to link faculty and students in the United States with faculty and
students in Europe, Asia, and South America.
The use of satellites to transmit video and audio signals is another form of
synchronous technology. However, transmission of video by means of satellite
typically allows only one-way communication between the participants at a given
location and participants at distant locations unless both locations have uplink
and downlink capacities. When satellite technology is used in business or
educational arenas, achieving two-way communication usually requires that the
technology be supplemented by the use of telephonic, e-mail, or web-based
communication.
Over the last decade high-speed internet connectivity has enabled the
development of personal VTC systems that use webcams, software compression,
and desktop computers. Picture and audio quality has steadily approached
broadcast quality, and costs have dropped significantly. Proponents of VTC
COMPETING IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL CONVERGENCE (1997); ANDY COVELL, DIGITAL CONVERGENCE:
HOW THE MERGING OF COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS AND MULTIMEDIA Is TRANSFORMING OUR
LIVES (1999); Michael J. Murphy, Convergence, Interactive Media, and Innovation, Inno'v@-tion2,
http://www.innovation.ca/innovation2/essaymurphy.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006)
("Convergence is the melding of previously segregated fields of computing, telecommunications,
and broadcasting.").
40. Videoconferencing, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video
-teleconference (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
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systems maintain that the interactions between individuals nearly replicate the
interactions that would occur in a face-to-face environment. Those who have
advocated the use of VTC in dispute resolution note that participants can discern
changes in facial expressions and body language that may relate to an
individual's credibility and voracity.41 The use of VTC in dispute resolution has
the obvious advantage of saving time and travel costs associated with face-to-
face meetings. However, access remains a serious problem; not all parties in a
dispute may have the hardware necessary to participate in a VTC. Currently
corporations and other large organizations may have VTC hardware and using
VTC in business-to-business disputes has become increasingly feasible. Low-
income individuals may lack the means to purchase the hardware necessary to
participate in a VTC, so the use of the technology in disputes involving these
individuals remains limited.
In addition to accessibility, another limitation on the use of VTC for dispute
resolution is scalability. In practical terms, there is a limit on how many
individuals can effectively participate in a VTC, particularly if the individuals are
at multiple sites. Accordingly, VTC may be an effective technology for two-
party or three-party disputes, but its effectiveness declines as the number of
parties in the dispute increases.
Asynchronous technologies are more commonly used for dispute resolution
than synchronous ones. The development of the Internet spawned the use of
asynchronous technologies, including e-mail, the World Wide Web, file sharing,
and instant messaging. Anyone with a desktop computer is already familiar
with most forms of asynchronous technologies so we will not dwell on the topic
here. Almost all of the best known and presumably most successful online
dispute resolution services rely on asynchronous, web-based technologies
including clickNsettle,43 Cybersettle, 4  and SquareTrade.45  Because of the
widespread availability of desktop computing and the Internet, web-based ODR
services are usually more accessible than video teleconferencing, and the
hardware costs are likely to be significantly lower. Also, the scalability of web-
based ODR services far exceeds that of video teleconferencing. Conversely,
users of web-based services typically cannot see or be seen by the other parties in
41. See James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903, 932 (2002)
(examining the use of video and assessment of credibility in the court room).
42. In common usage, the Internet and the World Wide Web are often used synonymously, but
this is an error. "The Internet is a collection of interconnected computer networks, linked by copper
wires, fiber-optic cables, wireless connections, etc.; the Web is a collection of interconnected
documents, linked by hyperlinks and URLs, and is accessible using the Internet." Internet,
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
43. Overview, clickNsettle.com Inc., http://www.business.com/directory/law/clicknsettle-com,
inc/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
44. Information, Cybersettle.com, http://www.cybersettle.com/info/main.aspx (last visited
Sept. 7, 2006).
45. Learn More, SquareTrade.com, https://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/odr/overviewodr.jsp
;jsessionid=ysb5xy6O22?vhosti (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). An excellent source for ODR
information is The Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution website,
http://www.odr.info/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
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the dispute (unless the online service uses webcams or a related technology; we
are not aware of any ODR service that does at this time). Some may consider
that, insofar as resolving disputes is concerned, the visual interaction that is an
integral part of video teleconferencing gives that technology an advantage over
text-based web communication. Some argue that the impersonality of the
Internet hinders effective dispute resolution.4 Others maintain, by contrast, that
online text-based communication is every bit as capable of building and
sustaining interpersonal relationships as either face-to-face communication or
communication via video teleconferencing.47
B. The Origins of the Dispute
Distinguishing disputes that originate online from those that originate offline is
another critical dimension of ODR to consider in building an analytical model of
ODR. When ODR first flourished, the dominant type of disputes channeled to
online providers were ones that arose from online interactions or activity. 48 In
fact, many of the arguments in favor of ODR rested on the claim that an online
forum was a more suitable arena for the new and emerging types of disputes in
cyberspace. 49 However, as ODR evolved into a sizeable segment of the dispute
resolution world, it was used for the resolution of disputes that were the product
of offline interactions and activities.50 For example, one of the areas in which
ODR is used to resolve disputes originating offline is international arbitration.
51
Just as the type of technology used to resolve a dispute has important
implications for assessing the dispute resolution process, so does the origins of
the dispute. For example, the nature of the parties' previous interactions and
relationships will differ if their dispute begins offline rather than online. Many of
the disputes online are between parties that have never met and most likely will
have no further interactions after the resolution of their dispute. E-commerce
disputes are a good example. Parties turning to an ODR provider for the
resolution of an online commerce dispute tend to have no previous relationship
and little prospect of having future contact. Offline disputes, however, include
disputes that are likely very different in this regard. For example, the use of
ODR for a workplace dispute will involve parties that have a pre-existing
46. See generally Larson, supra note 12.
47. See generally id
48. KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 19.
49. See, e.g., Katsh, supra note 5, at 283.
50. See KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 7 (discussing ODR efficiencies compared to offline
procedures).
51. See Melissa Conley Tyler, 115 and Counting: The State of ODR 2004, Center for
Information Technology and Dispute Resolution, http://www.odr.info/unforum2004/ConleyTyler.
htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) (discussing the extent to which ODR services address offline
disputes). The article tracks 115 ODR sites and analyzes a variety of dimensions. With regard to
the breakdown of sites in terms of their use for resolving online or offline disputes, the author finds
that 39 of the 115 sites are used for online originating disputes; 34 of the 115 sites are used for
offline originating disputes, and 42 sites are used for all types of disputes. Id.
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relationship, and these parties will be concerned about whether they can sustain
their relationship after their dispute is resolved.
We believe developing an analytical model for ODR requires that this
dimension be captured. Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that some of the
alleged limitations of ODR regarding its impersonal nature would be alleviated
when the dispute originated in the face-to-face world. Similarly, legal questions
regarding jurisdiction and enforceability are likely to be less challenging if the
dispute originates offline rather than online.
C. The Resolution Technique
There is a central distinction in ODR between automated and facilitated
dispute resolution. Automated resolution is a technique used by some ODR
websites that provides software-based solutions for disputing parties. For the
most part, automated techniques are used with negotiating parties who are not
seeking the aid of a third party. The technique does not call for any interaction
between the parties but merely requires them to submit their proposals and
counterproposals. The program software then determines whether there is a zone
of possible settlement.5
One popular form of automated negotiation is called blind bidding. For
example, clickNsettle asks each party to enter a settlement offer into its online
system. The software algorithm then compares the offers of the parties and
determines whether they are within a preset range of each other, usually within
20% to 30% of each other.53 If the offers meet this requirement, the software
program will split the difference and inform the parties they have reached an
agreement. If the offers do not meet this requirement, the parties are informed
that they do not have a settlement, and the program destroys the record.54 The
clickNsettle system limits the period of time the parties can enter offers and
counteroffers; within that period they can enter as many offers as they want,
provided they alter every successive offer by a specified percentage after each
unsuccessful round.55 There are some ODR websites that provide third-party
neutrals with an automated component of the dispute resolution process.56
Facilitated techniques have been used for negotiations, mediations, and
arbitrations. One form of facilitation simply provides the parties in a dispute
with an online space that allows them to negotiate with each other. However,
this is seldom the only mechanism used in facilitated dispute resolution. Rather,
it is often the first step in a series that leads to mediation and, occasionally,
52. Goodman, supra note 2, 3.
53. KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 61.
54. Id. at 61-62.
55. Goodman, supra note 2, 5. See also KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 61-63; Richard
John Galati, Jr., Evaluating Current Methods and Assessing Future Implications of Online Dispute
Resolution (May 2006) (unpublished senior honors thesis, Cornell University) (manuscript at 28-
29, on file with author).
56. See Katsh, supra note 5, at 287-89 (discussing the manner in which ODR tools can provide
neutrals with automated options).
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arbitration.57 Facilitation is also used for other aspects of dispute resolution,
including complaint handling and case appraisal. 8
It seems obvious that the technique-automated or facilitated-used by online
providers is likely to have a significant effect on both the process and the
outcomes of a dispute. Evaluating ODR without accounting for this dimension is
similar to evaluating face-to-face mediation without accounting for whether the
mediator used a transformative or evaluative approach.59 Therefore, we contend
that this dimension should also be incorporated into any effort to model ODR
processes and outcomes.
D. The ADR Procedure Used
The fourth dimension is the actual dispute resolution procedure the ODR
provider uses. ODR has incorporated the full range of traditional ADR
procedures developed in the offline realm, ranging from two-party negotiations
to mediation, arbitration, and litigation.6 ° Much has been written about the nature
of each ADR procedures; thus, we will not discuss their characteristics here.61
Each of the major ADR techniques is characterized by procedures and processes
that are likely to influence the resolution process. Thus, accounting for the
57. SquareTrade, The Claim Room, and ECODIR are three sites that provide facilitated
negotiation; if negotiation fails, then each of these sites provides more formalized procedures for
resolving a dispute. See SquareTrade, supra note 28; The Claim Room,
http://www.theclaimroom.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2006); ECODIR (Electronic Consumer
Dispute Resolution), http://www.ecodir.org/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). In these systems, the
provider requests that a disputing party complete an electronic form that identifies the issues in
dispute and possible solutions. The provider then contacts the other disputing party and requests
that it complete a similar form and send it to the initiating party. Successful facilitated negotiations
occur when this initial exchange of information and positions leads the parties to reach agreement.
Goodman, supra note 2, 8; Galati, supra note 55, at 21.
58. For a useful breakdown in terms of the popularity of automated versus facilitated
techniques, see Tyler, supra note 51. Of the 115 sites she studied, approximately 20 provided
automated negotiations services; nearly 90 sites provided facilitated mediation or arbitration
services in addition to other forms of facilitated services. Id.
59. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 156-57 (2004) (discussing different models of mediation).
60. In the United States, iCourthouse is an electronic litigation service in which a plaintiff files
a complaint and includes a trial book consisting of his or her closing arguments, testimony and
affidavits, along with other documentation or evidence. The defendant then responds in kind with
his or her own trial book. Subsequently, a jury of iCourthouse members, selected by the disputing
parties, renders a verdict. These are advisory verdicts, not binding on the parties unless stipulated
in advance that they will abide by them. See iCourthouse, http://www.i-courthouse.com/
main.taf?&redir=0 (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). In Australia, the Federal Court has established an
eCourt that has been effective in handling certain kinds of disputes, especially those involving
native land claims and discrimination cases. Australia, with its very low population density, has
made a special effort to accommodate electronic courthouses. Melissa Conley Tyler & Di
Bretherton, Country Experiences of ODR: Australia, Proceedings of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Forum on ODR 2003, http://www.odr.info/unece2003/
pdf/tylerl.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
61. See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2000).
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fundamental differences between different ADR procedures is also essential in
the development of an integrated theoretical framework for the study of ODR.
There is a big difference between a dispute that originates offline, is submitted
to a provider that uses facilitated techniques and video teleconferencing, and is
resolved through negotiations by the parties, and a dispute that originates online
and is submitted to a provider that maintains a conventional website with an
automated program used to reach a settlement. We contend that a dispute of the
first type more closely approximates the experience the disputants would have in
the physical world than a dispute of the second type. ODR, we maintain, is a
large tent, and unless researchers incorporate these various dimensions into their
models, their ability to analyze ODR in a rigorous fashion will be seriously
limited.
IV. TOWARD A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING ODR:
APPLYING BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION THEORY
A number of themes emerge from our review of the standard criteria used to
evaluate ODR and our discussion of four central ODR dimensions. First, it is
apparent that the existing ODR literature has not attempted to incorporate the
various evaluation criteria into a coherent and integrated framework. We culled
the criteria from numerous articles on ODR that discuss some or all of the criteria
but do not attempt to incorporate them into a more rigorous model that contains
testable hypotheses.
Second, as we noted earlier, much of the literature on ODR has considered
evaluation criteria in an atheoretical and ad hoc manner. The discussion of ODR
has principally been shaped by the debate between proponents and opponents and
has not yet incorporated traditional social science theory-building. We believe
that ODR has now evolved to a stage that calls for the formation of models, the
generation of hypotheses, and the testing of hypotheses through sound social
science techniques. ODR advocates should support efforts to apply social
science methodologies to ODR because we are confident that the application of
such methodologies will deepen our understanding of ODR. That deeper
understanding will likely result in new applications of this powerful tool.
Third, the application of existing evaluation criteria does not reflect the
complex and varied nature of both the online and face-to-face dispute resolution
processes. Although communication and information-processing criteria have
been used to address some of the behavioral elements (such as trust) in dispute
resolution, there has been little attention paid to most of the behavioral or tactical
aspects of dispute resolution. Nor has it been recognized that the behavioral or
relational aspects of online dispute resolution will depend on the four dimensions
of ODR we discussed in the previous section. We do not mean to criticize earlier
writers because, as Thomas Kuhn emphasized in his classic work, The Structure
of Scientific Resolutions, the early researchers in a particular field must first map
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the critical questions that need to be addressed before theoretical models can be
built.
62
One of the most fertile sources of social science theory that can be applied to
ODR is bargaining and negotiation theory. Theories intended to enhance our
understanding of negotiation, bargaining, and dispute resolution in the face-to-
face world should be useful in enhancing our understanding of these processes in
the online world. Virtually every social science discipline has developed its own
brand of bargaining or negotiation theory.63 We cannot attempt in this article to
apply the full range of bargaining and negotiation theory to ODR. Instead, we
chose to focus on the "behavioral" theory formulated by Richard E. Walton and
Robert B. McKersie, which was most notably explicated in A Behavioral Theory
of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System.64
Theories of negotiation and bargaining attempt to explain (1) strategy (i.e., the
parties' choice of goals and objectives and their plans to achieve them),
(2) structure (i.e., whether the bargaining situation involves individuals, groups,
organizations, or other entities, and the locus of decision making in negotiation),
62. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1 (1962). See also David
B. Lipsky & Ariel C. Avgar, Research on Employment Dispute Resolution: Toward a New
Paradigm, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 175 (2002) (applying Kuhn's concept of scientific paradigms to
employment dispute resolution).
63. See generally ALLAN M. CARTER, THEORY OF WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT (1959) (classic
work in economics); JAN PEN, THE WAGE RATE UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (T.S. Preston
trans., HarE. Univ. Press 1959) (same); FREDERIK ZEUTHEN, PROBLEMS OF MONOPOLY AND
ECONOMIC WARFARE (1930) (same); JOHN G. CROSS, THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING (1969)
(same); J.R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES (1932) (same); John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem,
18 ECONOMETRICA 155-62 (1950) (classic work in game theory); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (same); John F. Nash, Two Person Cooperative Games, 21
ECONOMETRICA 128 (1953) (same); ANATOL RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES (1960)
(same); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) (same); JOHN C.
HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS
(1977) (same); CARL M. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION (1963)
(classic work in industrial relations); NEIL CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1951) (same);
MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973) (classic work in sociology); R.M.
Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 31(1961) (same); John R.P. French &
Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER (Dorwin Cartwright ed.,
1959) (same); SAMUEL B. BACHARACH & EDWARD J. LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS, AND
OUTCOMES (1981) (same); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (classic work in management);
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR (1986) (same); MAX H.
BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY (1992) (classic work in social
psychology); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981) (same); ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (classic work in political science); 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE
50% SOLUTION (1976) (same). See also ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION (5th ed. 2006)
(discussing most of these theories in a best-selling textbook, but not those in economics or game
theory); AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY (1999) (covering game theoretic
approaches to bargaining in an introductory text; Nash's theory of bargaining is explained in
chapter 16, at 521-49).
64. RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (ILR Press, 2d ed. 1991) (1965).
See also RICHARD E. WALTON ET AL., STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS: A THEORY OF CHANGE IN LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994) (important sequel to A BEHAVIORAL THEORY).
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(3) process (i.e., the interactions between the parties in negotiations, including
their choice of tactics and other behaviors), and (4) outcomes (i.e., whether
negotiations result in an agreement and the nature of that agreement). Very few
theorists have attempted the gargantuan task of producing a truly comprehensive
theory of negotiation that explains all the dimensions of a bargaining situation.
Rather, most theorists focus on one or two dimensions and ignore the others. For
example, game theorists focus on strategy and outcomes, sociologists on process
and power, and psychologists on process and behavior.
Although Walton and McKersie did not develop a truly comprehensive theory
of negotiation, they managed to synthesize more disparate threads of theory than
any one had done before (and few have tried to do since then). A hallmark of
Walton and McKersie's theory is that they adopted concepts and principles
initially developed by economists and game theorists and interpreted them in
behavioral terms, using ideas from other disciplines, especially industrial
relations and sociology.65 For example, they borrowed the game theorists'
distinction between "zero-sum" games and "non-zero-sum" or "variable-sum"
games. 66 They initially focused their theory on explaining labor-management
negotiations; their work has proven particularly useful in that context.67 But in
the decades since the first edition of their book appeared, researchers have found
that their behavioral theory can be profitably applied to any bargaining situation
involving negotiation between groups, organizations, and other entities-
situations in which a negotiator (or agent) represents constituents (or principals).
For example, the theory has been applied to negotiations between supervisors and
employees, 68 environmental disputes, 69 "public" disputes involving government
agencies and voters,70  Native American disputes,71  and international
relationships.72 As Kochan and Lipsky have noted, "Walton and McKersie's
theory has proved to be relevant in a wide variety of settings. Indeed, the robust
nature of their theory is a phenomenon seldom encountered in the social
sciences. 7 3
65. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 1-10.
66. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1943) (widely regarded as the book that launched the field of game theory).
67. A good example of the authors' own application of their theory to labor-management
relations can be found in JOEL CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD ET AL., PATHWAYS TO CHANGE: CASE
STUDIES OF STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS (1995).
68. Janice A. Klein, Changing Relations Between Supervisors and Employees: From Deal
Making to Strategic Negotiations, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE: FROM THE WORKPLACE TO
SOCIETY 54 (Thomas A. Kochan & David B. Lipsky eds., 2003).
69. See Max H. Bazerman & Andrew J. Hoffman, Applying the Insights of Walton and
McKersie to the Environmental Context, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE, supra note 68, at 257.
70. See Lawrence Susskind, Collective Bargaining and Public Policy Dispute Resolution:
Similarities and Differences, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE, supra note 68, at 269.
71. See Lavinia Hall & Charles Heckscher, Negotiating Identity: First-Person Plural
Subjective, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE, supra note 68, at 279.
72. See Ji Li & Chalmer E. Libig, Jr., Negotiating with China: Exploratory Study of
Relationship Building, J. MGMT. ISSUES, Fall 2001, at 192-94.
73. Introduction, NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE, supra note 68, at 12.
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In brief, Walton and McKersie postulate that negotiations involving agents and
principals consist of four subprocesses, which they label distributive bargaining,
integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring, and intraorganizational
bargaining.74 It is worth noting immediately that distributive bargaining is the
analogue to a zero-sum game, while integrative bargaining is the analogue to a
non-zero-sum game. In the former, the parties' interests and positions are purely
in conflict; in the latter they are not.75 We will provide a precis of each of these
subprocesses, but we want to caution the reader that our abridgement of Walton
and McKersie's text necessarily sacrifices much of the richness of their analysis.
Also, for ease of understanding, we will assume there are two parties in the
bargaining situation; Walton and McKersie's theory can be applied to
negotiations involving multiple parties.
A. Distributive Bargaining
Distributive bargaining is the term used to describe the aspect of the
negotiation process that constitutes a pure conflict of interests or positions
between the negotiators. 6 Game theorists refer to a game in which the players'
interests are entirely in conflict as a zero-sum game. 7  For ease of
conceptualization, researchers frequently refer to a proverbial "pie," which needs
to be divided between the negotiators. The larger the share of the pie one
negotiator obtains, the smaller the share obtained by his or her opponent.7 8 In
other words, in a zero-sum game the proceeds or rewards allocated between the
two negotiators are fixed. Moreover, for authentic zero-sum conditions to hold,
one needs to imagine that an initial allocation of available rewards has already
taken place, and the negotiators face the challenge of negotiating a different
allocation of those rewards. The initial allocation of rewards is the default
position of the parties; it is the share of the proceeds each party would obtain if
negotiations did not occur at all. For example, party A initially may have a
quarter of the pie and party B the remaining three quarters. If party A wants to
increase its share of the pie, party B must sacrifice part of what it already
possesses. In this situation one party's gain represents the other party's loss-a
situation often characterized as a "win-lose" game. It is theoretically and
actually impossible for both sides to gain in a true zero-sum game.79
74. WALTON & McKERSm, supra note 64, at 4-6.
75. See id. at 13-45, 126-43.
76. See id. at 13-45.
77. See, e.g., MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBrNSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 21 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, in WHAT'S FAIR:
ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 30-31 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004).
79. It is useful to introduce two closely related concepts from economics in this discussion.
One is efficiency: an efficient solution in bargaining is one in which all of the available proceeds in
the game are distributed to the players, and nothing is "wasted." In other words, if the entire pie is
divided between the parties, and no pieces of the pie are left over, the division is considered an
efficient one. In the parlance of every-day negotiations, an efficient outcome would be one in
which the negotiators "leave nothing on the table." Closely related to the concept of efficiency is
the concept of Pareto optimality. The condition of Pareto optimality exists when no individual can
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In real life there are many examples of zero-sum games; virtually all games
that people play for recreation are zero-sum games. In baseball and football,
poker and chess, and countless other games, there is clearly a winner and a loser
(not counting the possibility of ties). In other forms of social interaction, it is not
so clear that zero-sum games are the norm. Is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a
zero-sum game? What about the U.S. involvement in Iraq? Some observers
might argue that they are zero-sum games, but most social scientists are far from
confident that every war is a zero-sum game.
Walton and McKersie recognized that the strategy and tactics a party uses in
distributive bargaining will and should differ from the strategies and tactics that a
party uses in integrative bargaining. For example, in distributive bargaining a
party will stake out strong commitments, restrict the amount of information
shared with an opponent, engage in bluff and misrepresentation, use coercive
tactics such as threats and warnings, and have a point in negotiations where a
party will not compromise (which Walton and McKersie call a "resistance
point") that a party may or may not share with an opponent. °  Walton and
McKersie recognized that how one behaves in bargaining depends on what one
believes about the nature of the game.
B. Integrative Bargaining
Walton and McKersie use the term integrative bargaining to describe the
aspect of the negotiation process that allows the parties to seek joint or mutual
gains. The parties' interests and positions are not in direct conflict in integrated
bargaining; rather, the parties share common goals and interests. One party's
gain is not at the expense of the other part; the pie is not fixed but can be
expanded to potentially benefit both parties. An alternative characterization,
which is equivalent to "expanding the pie," is to picture a situation in which two
negotiators have not yet divided up a pie, but have the task of doing so. At the
start of negotiations, neither party has a single "piece" of the pie, but they do
have the opportunity of negotiating its allocation. If, for example, the two parties
decide that one should have two-thirds of the pie and the other one-third, both
have ended up with more than they had before the negotiations occurred.
be made better off without another being made worse off. The terms Pareto optimality and Pareto
efficiency are used interchangeably: all Pareto optimal outcomes are efficient outcomes. In a zero-
sum game there are (theoretically) an infinite number of ways to divide the pie; each division is
Pareto optimal, but to move from one division to another means that one player gains while the
other loses. See, e.g., DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 18-23, 397-98 (2d. prtg.
1992); OSBORNE & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 7, 122, 125, 290, 305.
80. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 58-125. The ethical implications of using
distributive tactics in negotiation have been widely discussed and debated. Some writers argue that
the use of deception, threats, and other coercive tactics in negotiation is justified if the parties have
a mutual expectation that such tactics will be used; other writers justify the use of such tactics if a
party in negotiation expects an opponent to engage in potentially wrongful or harmful conduct.
See, e.g., WHAT'S FAIR, supra note 78, chs. 7-13 (compilation of various viewpoints on use of
distributive tactics in negotiation).
81. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 126-43.
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This example illustrates that disputes may occur even in integrated bargaining
situations. Even though joint gains are possible, the parties may disagree on the
precise division of the pie. Focusing on labor-management relations, Walton and
McKersie point out that the distributive or integrative nature of negotiations may
depend on the issue in dispute. In bargaining between an employer and a union,
the wage issue might well be distributive (higher wages for employees may mean
lower profits for the employer, so the union's gain is the employer's loss). Other
issues, however, may be integrative ones. For example, it is often in the best
interests of both unions and employers to strive to achieve improved safety and
health conditions for employees. Obviously, employees desire safe and healthful
working conditions, while employers desire reduced costs of insurance coverage
and lawsuits if they provide these conditions. Thus, cooperation between the
union and the employer on job safety can lead to joint gains. However, although
unions and employers can achieve joint gains on job safety, disputes can arise
over how much safety is needed to satisfy the interests of both parties.
Employees may desire to reduce the risk of injury on the job to zero, whereas
employers seldom believe that the benefits they would obtain from doing so
outweigh the costs they would incur. 82 In Walton and McKersie's discussion of
management's desire for flexibility and the union's desire for job security for its
members, they note that each issue considered in isolation could be a distributive,
zero-sum issue. But negotiating the two issues in tandem allows for the parties to
engage in tradeoffs that convert a potentially distributive situation into an
integrative one.
83
Walton and McKersie discuss the tactical and other behavioral implications of
integrative bargaining. Cooperation, information sharing, openness, and joint
problem solving are the hallmarks of integrative bargaining. In distributive
bargaining, the parties ordinarily are adversaries, but they need not be in
integrative bargaining. Rather, the parties become joint problem solvers. If the
parties truly share joint goals, objectives, and values, they can work together as a
team to achieve solutions for their concerns. Distributive tactics, such as bluff,
deception, and threats, are inappropriate and unnecessary in integrative
bargaining. Integrative bargaining is generally characterized by an open flow of
communications, a high level of mutual trust and respect, and a positive and
supportive climate.
84
Integrative bargaining is a term that has entered the popular lexicon, and it is
frequently used interchangeably with "win-win" bargaining. Fisher and Ury, in
Getting to Yes, indisputably the most widely read book on negotiation, developed
an approach they term "interest-based" bargaining or "principled negotiation.
'
,
85
In the literature on negotiation and in practice, the terms integrative bargaining,
win-win bargaining, interest-based bargaining, and principled negotiation are
frequently used interchangeably. However, a close reading of Walton and
82. THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNION-MANAGEMENT SAFETY AND
HEALTH COMMITTEES 13-14 (1977).
83. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 129-35.
84. Id. at 137-43.
85. FISHER & URY, supra note 63, at 41-57.
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McKersie and Fisher and Ury reveals that there is only a partial correspondence
between integrative bargaining and interest-based bargaining. If "hard" tactics
are associated with distributive bargaining and "soft" tactics with integrative
bargaining, then the approach proposed by Fisher and Ury is a third approach,
which is neither hard nor soft but "principled." In distributive bargaining, the
parties often mistrust each other, but in integrative bargaining the parties'
relationship is characterized by high levels of trust. In contrast Fisher and Ury
recommend that the parties "proceed independent of trust" in principled
86negotiations.
C. Attitudinal Structuring
Attitudinal structuring is the term Walton and McKersie use to describe that
aspect of the negotiation process that involves "a maintenance or restructuring of
the attitudes of the participants toward each other. The attitudes of eachparty
toward the other, taken together, define the relationship between them." In
developing this subprocess, Walton and McKersie meld behavioral and social-
psychological concepts into their theory. They maintain attitudinal structuring
encompasses the parties' motivational orientation toward each other, each party's
beliefs about the other's legitimacy, each party's feelings of trust about the other,
and each party's feelings of friendship or hostility. They posit that the pattern
(or the nature) of the relationship between the parties depends, in part, on the
environment in which the parties negotiate as well as the personalities of the
negotiators.
88
In considering Walton and McKersie's theory, one implication that has both
theoretical and practical significance is the connection between attitudinal
structuring and distributive and integrative bargaining. To what extent is there a
connection? Do the attitudes of the parties affect the bargaining process and
bargaining outcomes? One might easily imagine that attitudes must
unquestionably influence the process and outcomes of negotiation; on reflection
one realizes that the interactions across the subprocesses of negotiation are quite
complex. It is probably true that most people prefer a relationship characterized
by friendship, open communication, high levels of trust, and low levels of stress.
These positive characteristics of a relationship generally are associated with
integrative bargaining. As Walton and McKersie point out, positive attitudes
may interfere with the process of distributive bargaining. "A tactic designed to
86. Id. Fisher and Ury call the conventional approach to negotiation "positional bargaining."
Id. at 5. Interestingly, they never cite Walton and McKersie in Getting to Yes, although it seems to
us their debt to Walton and McKersie is quite obvious. Implicitly, at least, Fisher and Ury attempt
to develop an alternative approach to negotiation that stands in contrast not only to Walton and
McKersie but all earlier negotiation theorists. Whether they succeeded in developing a truly unique
approach, let alone one that produces more efficient and satisfactory outcomes than positional
bargaining, has been subject to considerable debate. See, e.g., Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, How
Process Matters: A Five-Phase Model for Examining Interest-Based Bargaining, in NEGOTIATIONS
AND CHANGE, supra note 68, at 141-60.
87. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 184.
88. Id. at 185-209.
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promote a better relationship frequently entails a sacrifice of the substance of
distributive bargaining; and conversely a tactic designed to achieve a distributive
gain often adversely affects the relationship., 89 A fundamental quandary is the
following: Are positive attitudes a desirable attribute for the parties to foster,
regardless of all other considerations? That is, can they serve as an end in
themselves? Or are the parties' attitudes, whether positive or negative,
principally instrumental, shaped by the parties' desire to serve larger purposes?
Walton and McKersie clearly believe that attitudes are instrumental and should
not be "structured" without due consideration for the larger context of
negotiations.9" In other words, whether a party should behave in a friendly or
hostile fashion (or choose any other tactic or form of behavior) with a bargaining
opponent depends on the goals and objectives the party wants to achieve in
negotiations.
D. Intraorganizational Bargaining
Intraorganizational bargaining is the term Walton and McKersie use to
describe the aspect of the negotiation process that deals with the relationship
between a principal negotiator and the members of his or her negotiating team,
between the team and the people or constituencies the team represents, and
between one constituency and others within the organization engaged in
negotiation. Intraorganizational bargaining is partly a matter of the relationship
between an agent and the agent's principal and partly (if an agent represents
multiple principals) a matter of the relationship amongst the principals. Walton
and McKersie were not the first scholars to recognize that organizations are not
monolithic; they usually consist of multiple interest groups, stakeholders, and
constituencies. 9I Negotiators need to worry about whether they have the support
of the stakeholders and constituents they represent.92 The term often used for
achieving agreement through intraorganizational bargaining is "alignment.,
93
There are several methods an organization can use to achieve internal alignment
89. Id. at 270.
90. Id. at 268-80.
91. E.g., JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 108-10, 137-49 (2d ed.
Blackwell Publishers 1993) (1958) (the classic work on the topic). The so-called "pluralist" view
of organizations holds that interest groups within an organization are motivated by political self-
interest. See TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL
DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS (1988). See generally SAMUEL B. BACHARACH, POWER
AND POLITICS IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT, COALITIONS, AND
BARGAINING (1980). For a popular treatment of intraorganizational bargaining, focusing on how an
individual can successfully form a coalition within an organization, see SAMUEL B. BACHARACH,
GET THEM ON YOUR SIDE 73-191 (2005).
92. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 281-302.
93. See LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 4, at 324-31 (discussing the challenge of aligning workplace
dispute resolution systems with the mission and values of the organization as well as other
workplace processes and functions).
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including the exercise of formal authority by a superior, decision by majority
rule, and a true consensus, requiring unanimity.
Anyone who has ever served as a negotiator understands that it may be even
more difficult to resolve conflicts within an organization than it is to resolve
conflicts between organizations. Before Walton and McKersie wrote their
classic book, industrial relations scholars had long recognized that unions were
highly political entities, often racked by internal dissention and conflict. Some
union leaders were able to achieve sufficient authority to resolve or suppress
internal dissention, but other union leaders found it much more difficult to
achieve a united front for the purposes of negotiating with employers. 95 Walton
and McKersie devote most of their discussion of intraorganizational bargaining
to the challenges unions face in achieving "solidarity" but devote very little space
to intraorganizational bargaining on the management side of the table. 96 Building
on Walton and McKersie, Lax and Sebenius analyze the difficulties managers
encounter in achieving alignment between their goals and interests and those of
the individuals and groups they manage.
97
A negotiator not only needs to focus on achieving alignment on his or her side
of the table but also has a vital stake in understanding and possibly influencing
the internal alignment of interests on the other side of the table.98 If negotiations
are primarily distributive in nature, then a negotiator will simultaneously seek to
unify his or her constituencies and to foster division among the groups
represented by an opponent. "Divide and conquer" is not simply an old saw in
conflicting relationships, but rather part of the arsenal of tactics employed by a
professional negotiator. There are many tactics a negotiator can use to
understand and influence the dynamics of the opposition. A classic tactic is the
"end run," which is an effort by a principal negotiator to bypass the opposing
negotiator and communicate directly with that negotiator's superiors or
constituents. As Walton et al. note, "The 'end run' by management is perhaps
the most vivid tactic used by one party [in collective bargaining] to sow divisions
in the other side." 99  Obviously, the use of the end run is not confined to
collective bargaining but is a tactic frequently used in many types of conflicts.
94. LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 366-67.
95. Walton and McKersie cite several classic works on the difficulty of achieving union
"solidarity" in the face of competing interest groups that exist within the union. See LEONARD R.
SAYLES & GEORGE STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION: ITS PLACE IN THE INDUSTRIAL PLANT (1953); L.H.
Fisher & Grant McConnell, Internal Conflict and Labor-Union Solidarity, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
132-43 (Arthur Kornhauser et al. eds., 1954). There is a vast literature on overcoming internal
conflict in unions. See, e.g., Karen Brodkin & Cynthia Strathmann, The Struggle for Hearts and
Minds: Organization, Ideology, and Emotion, 29 LABOR STUD. J., Fall 2004, at 1. See also
ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA (Ruth
Milkman ed., 2000) (analyzing, among other matters, the difficulties faced by unions attempting to
organize disparate immigrant groups in Southern California).
96. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 281-309.
97. LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 63, at 154-82 (discussing the manager's role as a "mediator"
who seeks to resolve conflicts between different interest groups within the organization).
98. WALTON ET AL., supra note 64, at 46-47.
99. Id. at 278-79.
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During World War II, for example, both sides used various forms of
communication and espionage to undermine the confidence citizens and soldiers
had in their leaders. In 1942, the United States created the Voice of America,
which broadcast news and information directly to Germany and German-
occupied territories. During the Cold War, the VOA broadcast directly to Soviet
citizens, attempting to bypass their leaders. Today, VOA continues to operate
various services, including Radio Marti, which directs its broadcasts to Cuba, and
Radio Sawa, which attempts to reach younger people in Arab countries.'00 The
use of propaganda is common not only in international conflicts but also in many
other conflict situations.
A classic illustration of a situation in which one side has the opportunity to
undermine the unity of an opponent is the Prisoner's Dilemma, probably the best
known of all non-zero-sum games. In 1950, Albert Tucker was the first to devise
a narrative used to explain the Prisoner's Dilemma.'0 ' Over time the narrative
has evolved and usually takes the following form: Two criminals make a solemn
pledge to keep silent about a crime they have committed. When they are
arrested, however, the police place them in separate cells and interrogate them
individually. Each prisoner realizes that if his partner confesses and turns state's
evidence, his partner will get no sentence, but he will get a severe sentence. The
two prisoners face a dilemma; if they remain faithful to their pledge, they will
each get a light sentence, but this depends on one prisoner trusting the other to
remain silent. Each prisoner has a very strong incentive to betray his partner and
confess; by doing so he will go free. The Prisoner's Dilemma has proven to be
an apt description of many real-life interactions ranging from trench warfare
during World War I to conflict between Congress and the Federal Reserve
Bank. 02 In the Prisoner's Dilemma, a player must confront the necessity of
choosing whether to cooperate or compete with his or her "partner." According
to Walton and McKersie, this closely parallels the dilemma faced by a typical
negotiator, namely, whether to use principally distributive (i.e., competitive)
tactics or principally integrative (i.e., cooperative) tactics in negotiations.
In a real-life Prisoner's Dilemma, police interrogators understand the dilemma
that prisoners face and can use negotiating tactics to exploit the situation. Police
and prosecutors, for example, often offer deals to one suspect if he or she will
confess and implicate another suspect. Prosecutors can also use deception to
achieve their objectives; they can lie and tell one prisoner that his partner has
100. Voice of America, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiNoice_
of America (last visited Aug. 28, 2006).
101. WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 116-21 (1992). Poundstone points out that it
was actually Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresser who devised the game that Tucker later
characterized as a Prisoner's Dilemma. Id. at 106-16.
102. AXELROD, supra note 63, at 73-87 (applying the Prisoner's Dilemma to trench warfare
during World War I); AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 115-18 (1991) (applying the
Prisoner's Dilemma to conflict between the U.S. Congress and the Federal Reserve).
103. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 64, at 58, 144.
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already confessed even though he has not to eliminate any motive the prisoner
may have to remain silent.1 04
To recapitulate, negotiators need to use intraorganizational bargaining for two
purposes: to achieve the alignment of the multiple constituencies they represent
and to understand and possibly affect the extent to which the opposing
negotiators' constituencies are aligned.
E. Negotiating Dilemmas: Mixed-Motive Decision Making
We have already touched on a central theme in Walton and McKersie's theory,
namely, the dilemmas faced by negotiators. Webster's defines dilemma as any
situation "necessitating a choice between equally unfavorable or disagreeable
alternatives"; in other words, a dilemma is any "perplexing or awkward
situation."' 0 5  The essence of negotiation is choice, and negotiators must
constantly make choices on strategies and tactics knowing that any choice may
have potentially unsatisfactory consequences. In real life, negotiators seldom
play a purely distributive or integrative game. Rather, a negotiating situation
typically has both distributive and integrative elements. In their later work,
Walton and McKersie, joined by Cutcher-Gershenfeld, used the terminology
"forcing" and "fostering" strategies, which are essentially strategies associated
with either distributive or integrative bargaining, respectively.'0 6  In most
situations a negotiator has the twin objectives of both expanding the pie and
obtaining the largest share of it. Simultaneously, a negotiator needs to play both
a distributive game and an integrative game, sometimes using fostering strategies
to expand the pie and other times using forcing strategies to obtain the largest
share. Negotiators, accordingly, are continually engaged in "mixed-motive"
decision making.10 7 Unless negotiators know with certainty that they are playing
either a distributive, zero-sum game, or an integrative, non-zero-sum game, then
104. This is precisely what the Cook County prosecutor did in dealing with Nathan Leopond
and Richard Loeb after the two University of Chicago students murdered fourteen-year-old Bobby
Franks in 1924. See generally Leopold and Loeb, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold-and Loeb (last visited Aug. 28, 2006); HAL HIGDON,
LEOPOLD AND LOEB: THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY (1999). Most people know that police must give
criminal suspects a "Miranda warning." See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Many
people, however, do not realize that police officers and prosecutors have broad latitude to use
deception, tricks, lies, and dishonesty in interrogating criminal suspects and the Supreme Court has
never clearly prohibited such practices. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (the law
does not prohibit police from "mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's
misplaced trust"); In re D.A.S., 391 A.2d 255, 258 (D.C. 1978) ("Confessions are not generally
vitiated when they are obtained by deception or trickery, as long as the means employed are not
calculated to obtain an untrue statement.").
105. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 633 (16th ed. 1966).
106. WALTON ET AL., supra note 64, at 25-29, 48-49.
107. See generally Richard E. Walton & Robert B. McKersie, Behavioral Dilemmas in Mixed-
Motive Decision Making, I 1 BE-AV. Sci. 370 (1966). See also R.E. Fells, Overcoming the
Dilemmas in Walton and McKersie "s Mixed Bargaining Strategy, 53 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES
(1998), http://www.erudit.org/revue/ri/ 998/v53/n2/005276ar.pdf.
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negotiators have the difficult task of choosing the right mix of strategies and
tactics that will achieve their twin objectives.
Uncertainty about the nature of the game would seem to make the negotiator's
task twice as difficult. The contemporary approach to analyzing game-theoretic
conflicts is to recognize that the players are unlikely to know whether they are in
a zero-sum or a non-zero-sum game; they face uncertainty. Game theorists,
however, have demonstrated that it is not necessary for a player to know with
certainty the nature of the game he or she is playing. Rational parties in a
conflict can resolve their differences if they can develop reasonable estimates of
the probabilities of alternative outcomes. 08  In other words, in theory the
complex, mixed-motive nature of most negotiations is not necessarily a barrier to
achieving settlements.
For the practitioner, Walton and McKersie's theory can be translated into the
four major responsibilities a negotiator (or agent) must discharge in representing
his or her constituents (or principals): (1) the negotiator must get the best
possible deal he or she can for the people he or she represents (distributive
bargaining); (2) the negotiator must seek all the joint gains that are possible in the
bargaining situation (integrative bargaining); (3) the negotiator must be the
principal manager of the relationship between the parties in negotiations, doing
his or her best to steer the relationship in the direction that best serves the
interests of the people he or she represents (attitudinal structuring); and (4) the
negotiator must do his or her best to (a) achieve alignment of interests and goals
among the people he or she represents, and (b) understand and influence the
alignment of interests and goals of the other party in negotiations.
108. See, e.g., Adam M. Brandenburger, Strategy and Structural Uncertainty in Games, in WISE
CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 221 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996).
The distinction between zero-sum and non-zero-sum games is critical in an analysis of conflict
situations, but equally important is the degree to which the participants in a game have information
about the nature of the game they are playing. If the players had perfect information (or complete
information), a common assumption in economic theory, they would of course know whether in
fact they were playing a zero-sum or a non-zero-sum game. Usually, however, the players lack
complete information about the nature of the game and, accordingly, face uncertainty. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern maintain that it is critical to distinguish between games with complete
information and games with incomplete information. VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note
66, at 30. In the former, the players do not face uncertainty, and in the latter, they do. The
distinction is important because how one plays a game depends on whether it is a zero-sum or a
non-zero-sum game, but if a player is uncertain about the nature of the game, he or she may be
uncertain about how to play it. John Harsanyi was the first to demonstrate that an equilibrium (or
equilibria) existed for games with incomplete information; stable outcomes existed for such games
if the players could construct subjective probability distributions of the outcomes of the game.
"This approach, which defines rational behavior under uncertainty as expected-utility maximization
in terms of the decision maker's own subjective probabilities, is often called the Bayesian
approach." HARSANYI, supra note 63, at 9. See generally John C. Harsanyi, Games with
Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players I: The Basic Model, 14 MGMT. SCI. 159
(1967) (containing formulation of Bayesian approach); John C. Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete
Information Played by "Bayesian " Players II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points, 14 MGMT. SCI. 320
(1968) (same); John C. Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian"
Players III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game, 14 MGMT. ScI. 486 (1968) (same).
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V. APPLYING THE BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF NEGOTIATIONS TO ODR:
A THEORY BUILDING EXERCISE
In this section, we put Walton and McKersie's classic framework to work and
engage in a theory-building exercise designed to generate testable hypotheses
about how ODR influences the dispute resolution process. Our hypotheses are an
attempt to isolate the differences between dispute resolution in a face-to-face
environment and in an online environment. We want to understand how moving
from a face-to-face environment to an online environment may affect each of
Walton and McKersie's four subprocesses. We try our best to adopt a positive
rather than a normative approach to model building. We seek to avoid judgments
about whether ODR is better or worse than face-to-face dispute resolution.
Before proceeding with the exercise, a number of assumptions and clarifications
need to be made.
A. The Parameters and Scope of the Exercise
In developing our hypotheses, we need to make assumptions regarding the four
critical dimensions of ODR discussed above. In building a social science model,
it is necessary to introduce controls for intervening or mediating variables. In
effect, the assumptions we make about the four dimensions are our controls.
1. Technology
We assume that the technology used by the ODR provider is an asynchronous
one, specifically one that uses a standard, text-based website. We assert that the
use of this technology, rather than a synchronous one, accentuates the differences
between ODR and dispute resolution in a face-to-face environment.
2. Origins of the Dispute
In generating our hypotheses, we will initially assume that the dispute
originates online. We will then change this assumption and discuss how our
hypotheses are affected, if at all, if the dispute originates offline.
3. Resolution Technique
We assume that the resolution technique used by the ODR provider is a
facilitated one, rather than an automated one. In contrast with our assumption
about technology, we assert that our assumption about the resolution technique
diminishes the presumed differences between ODR and face-to-face dispute
resolution.
4. ADR Procedure Used
Last, and perhaps most importantly, we assume that negotiation, mediation, or
another "interest-based" option is the ADR procedure used to resolve the dispute,
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rather than arbitration, litigation, or another "rights-based" option.l°9 We assume
interest-based options are being used because doing so is more consistent with
Walton and McKersie's behavioral theory than the alternative. We do not mean
to imply that Walton and McKersie's theory cannot be applied to arbitration and
other rights-based options; rather, we imply that the authors clearly intended their
theory to apply to negotiations and other interest-based means of resolving
disputes.
A truly complete theoretical model would build in variation in each of the four
dimensions of ODR. Taking account of all the possible permutations in the four
dimensions would obviously be a daunting task and would multiply the number
of hypotheses generated by the application of the behavioral theory to ODR
(although varying assumptions about the dimensions would not materially affect
most of the hypotheses). For the purpose of demonstrating the type of analysis
we think is necessary, we choose to focus on the differences between face-to-face
and online dispute resolution, using the assumptions about the four dimensions
we outlined above.
It is helpful to offer a hypothetical of the situation we have in mind. Suppose
Organization A is interested in buying a commercial building from Organization
B. Organization A is represented by Negotiator A and Organization B by
Negotiator B. Walton and McKersie's theory can clearly be applied to the
analysis of this hypothetical. Each negotiator has the four principal
responsibilities, which stem from the four negotiation subprocesses described by
Walton and McKersie. In Situation A, imagine a scenario in which Negotiator A,
Negotiator B, and their respective teams, attempt to reach a deal in a face-to-face
setting. Compare this with Situation B, in which Negotiator A and Negotiator B
attempt to reach a face-to-face deal but reach impasse and turn to an ODR
provider for assistance. In other words, their dispute occurred offline. For the
purposes of the exercise, assume that the ODR provider has a conventional
website and uses a facilitated rather than an automated technique for assisting the
two parties. The task we have set is to develop hypotheses that describe whether
the differences between Situation A and Situation B affect the ability of
Negotiator A and Negotiator B to discharge their responsibilities with respect to
distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring, and
intraorganizational bargaining.
In conventional social science, it is always essential to distinguish the
dependent variable from the independent variables in a theoretical model. In our
model the dependent variable-the outcome we are attempting to explain-is the
negotiator's ability to meet his or her responsibilities with respect to Walton and
109. The terms "interest-based" and "rights-based" options are standard terms in the ADR
literature. The principal difference between interest-based and rights-based options is that the
parties largely control the settlement of the dispute in the former, whereas a third party imposes a
settlement on the parties in the latter. Of the many sources on this topic, see WILLIAM L. URY ET
AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 3-19
(1988).
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McKersie's four negotiation subprocesses. ' 0 Our key independent variable-the
variable that we hypothesize influences the dependent variable-is the use of
ODR. To focus our model more precisely, we have introduced control variables
that assume a specific type of ODR. There may be other intervening or
moderating variables that influence the relationship between the dependent
variable in our model and the key independent variable. For example, the
characteristics of the chief negotiators (their experience, age, gender, race, etc.)
may influence the dependent variable. If Larson is correct, the age of the
negotiators may moderate the influence of ODR on the dependent variable."'
The precise nature of the issues in the dispute might also have a significant
influence on the dependent variable. In our hypothetical, if Negotiator A and
Negotiator B are only negotiating price, this may have an effect on the dependent
variable that would differ from the effect on the dependent variable of negotiators
who are dealing with multiple issues, including the price of the building, the
terms of financing, and the use of the building. Clearly there are many factors
that conceivably moderate the influence of ODR on the negotiators.112
Operationalizing our key independent variable is relatively straightforward. It
is a dichotomous variable, denoting either the use of ODR as previously specified
or, alternatively, the use of traditional face-to-face interactions. Formulating
hypotheses about the effect of the use of ODR on the negotiators is more
complicated because there is considerable debate in the ODR literature on this
matter. Essentially, ODR writers divide into three distinct groups. The first
group argues that ODR has improved the way in which parties negotiate and
settle disputes. These writers claim that the use of ODR technologies and
techniques has enhanced overall the ADR process. Thus, the effect of ODR on
the dispute resolution process is positive. Writers in the second group-a
definite minority-argue that ODR has weakened the dispute resolution process;
the effect of ODR on these processes is negative.' 14  Last, the third group
maintains that because of the rapid advances in technological capabilities, the
differences between the online world and the face-to-face world are diminishing.
Therefore, the differences between ODR and face-to-face dispute resolution are
diminishing, possibly to the point of vanishing." 5 The writers in this group
110. Since our discussion is not limited to negotiations but also pertains to other interest-based
options (including mediation), the term "negotiator" is used broadly. It is a relatively easy matter
to apply Walton and McKersie to mediators, facilitators, and other third parties.
111. See generally Larson, supra note 12.
112. The social scientist with a purist approach to modeling would insist that other independent
or moderating variables should not be added to the model merely on an ad hoc basis but should be
added only if sound theory suggests that they belong in the model. There is abundant theory that
suggests that both the characteristics of negotiators and the issues they are negotiating influence the
course of their negotiations.
113. See, e.g., KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15; Katsh, supra note 5.
114. See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 7, at 1308.
115. The literature on convergence suggests that the differences between the face-to-face and
the online world are disappearing. If that has not totally been the case to date, these writers believe
it will be the case in the foreseeable future. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 39.
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would probably hypothesize that the use of ODR does not significantly affect a
negotiator's ability to fulfill his or her responsibilities116
In this article, we have voiced our reservations about making sweeping
generalizations regarding the effect of ODR on dispute resolution. Nevertheless,
we believe we need to take account of the views of the three groups in
developing our hypotheses. Therefore, we will frame each of our hypotheses
around three possible outcomes: (1) compared to face-to-face negotiations, the
use of ODR will have a positive effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or her
bargaining responsibilities; (2) compared to face-to-face negotiations, the use of
ODR will have a negative effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or her
bargaining responsibilities; and, (3) compared to face-to-face negotiations, the
use of ODR will have no significant effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or
her bargaining responsibilities."1 7  In the hypotheses generated below, we also
incorporate an indicator for the strength of ODR's effect by stating whether we
believe that the effect, be it positive or negative, is major or minor. In addition to
setting forth the actual hypotheses, we also identify the rationale behind the
proposed relationship between the dependent and independent variable.
Finally, in developing the hypotheses below, we do not refrain from offering
alternative, contradictory hypotheses. Given the exploratory nature of this
modeling process and the need to provide as much theoretical underpinnings as
possible for the empirical testing stage, we believe that a broad set of hypotheses
is preferable. Future empirical work can begin the important task of narrowing
the field by substantiating or challenging such hypotheses.
B. Distributive Bargaining Hypotheses
As noted above, distributive bargaining refers to the "zero sum" aspects of the
negotiations process, and the negotiator's responsibility in this bargaining
subprocess is to obtain as large a share of the pie as he or she can. A negotiator
in this form of bargaining is required, among other things, to engage in strategies
and tactics that limit the flow of information to the other side, to create an
intentional fog regarding the party's positions and resources, to be aggressive by
using threats and warnings, and to stay committed to a defined resistance point.
116. Social science researchers have for many years been examining the effect of the
substitution of various technologies for face-to-face interactions in education. In the literature on
distance learning and e-learning, social scientists have constructed models and tested hypotheses
that in many respects parallel those we are proposing in this article. For example, a considerable
amount of systematic research has been conducted on whether and to what extent online learning,
compared to face-to-face learning, influences the knowledge students acquire. Although the range
of results of such research is quite wide, on balance, the research suggests that there is no
significant difference between learning in the online world and learning in the face-to-face one.
See generally THOMAS L. RUSSELL, THE No SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE PHENOMENON (1999); CAROL
A. TWIGG, INNOVATIONS IN ONLINE LEARNING: MOVING BEYOND No SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
(2001), http://www.center.rpi.edu/Monographs/Mono4.pdf.
117. As will be seen below, we only make use of this option once. However, it is important to
list it as a possible effect because it infuses the other possibilities with additional meaning. In other
words, a hypothesized positive effect is not merely in contrast to a possible negative effect but also
to the possibility that using ODR will have no effect at all.
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Given the nature of this subprocess, use of ODR will almost certainly have an
effect on the negotiator's abilities to meet these responsibilities. The question
that emerges is in what manner would ODR affect negotiator capabilities?
It is likely that conducting the dispute resolution process online improves the
negotiator's ability to engage in tactics intended to restrict information and
obfuscate his or her party's bargaining situation. In traditional face-to-face
negotiation, it is common for a negotiator to expose, unintentionally through
spoken or unspoken communication, discretionary information that the negotiator
prefers not to reveal. Moreover, it is often difficult to ensure that in face-to-face
bargaining sessions, the members of a negotiating team do not communicate
restricted information. By contrast, in online dispute resolution, particularly
when there has been an absence of past or present face-to-face interactions, the
negotiator's ability to control intentional or unintentional flows of information is
likely to be improved. ODR cannot eliminate all unintentional signals or flows
of information that pass from one party to another. However, online
communication ought to allow the negotiator to exercise greater control over the
type and flow of information transmitted to an opposing negotiator. Thus, we
propose that insofar as ODR improves a negotiator's ability to control and restrict
the flow of information to the other party, ODR should have a positive effect on
the negotiator's ability to meet his or her responsibilities in distributive
bargaining.
Hypothesis ]a. When the dispute originates online, ODR procedures will have a
major positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale ]a. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to restrict the flow of
information and create ambiguities for the other side.
If a dispute originates offline, should our hypothesis be revised? In disputes
that originate offline, there is a greater likelihood that the disputing parties have
already established a face-to-face relationship. This implies that the disputing
parties may have already established direct or indirect channels of
communication, before they take their dispute online, that weaken the
negotiator's ability to restrict and control the flow of information to the other
side. Providing this assumption holds, we maintain that offline origination of a
dispute will modify Hypothesis la and reduce the effect of ODR on the
negotiator's capabilities in distributive bargaining to a minor positive effect.
Hypothesis lb. When the dispute originates offline, ODR procedures will have a
minor positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale lb. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to restrict the flow of
information and create ambiguities for the other side, but the existence of a pre-
existing relationship and channels of communication temper this effect.
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Restricting the flow of information and creating ambiguities are not the
negotiator's sole distributive bargaining responsibilities. At the same time that
the negotiator is attempting to limit the other party's access to information, he or
she is trying to attain an accurate understanding of the other party's true
positions. Achieving the best possible outcome for his or her party requires that
the negotiator gather as much information about the other party as possible.
Since ODR is hypothesized to improve each side's ability to "keep their cards
close to their vests," it also implies that negotiators will be impaired in their
ability to fulfill this aspect of their responsibilities.
Hypothesis 2a. When the dispute originates online, ODR procedures will have a
major negative effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 2a. ODR impairs the negotiator's ability to gather information about the
other party and to form an accurate assessment of the other party's bargaining
positions.
If a dispute originates offline, Hypothesis 2a needs to be revised. If the parties
have present or past offline communication and other means of interaction, then
moving a dispute online may not have a significant effect on one side's ability to
acquire "intelligence" about the other side. Therefore, we hypothesize that ODR
will have a minor negative effect on the negotiator's ability to acquire
information on an opponent's position if the dispute originates offline.
Hypothesis 2b. When the dispute originates offline, ODR procedures will have a
minor negative effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 2b. ODR impairs the negotiator's ability to gather information about the
other party and to form an accurate assessment of the other party's bargaining
conditions, but the existence a pre-existing relationship and channels of
communication temper this effect.
Another aspect of distributive bargaining is a negotiator's ability to make a
firm commitment to his or her bottom line. it8 In face-to-face negotiations, a
negotiator may convey his or her commitment to obtaining his or her demand by
a variety of devices. For example, saying emphatically and loudly, "I will not
give you a penny more for the property!" while banging your fist on the table is
one of many ways to convey commitment in the face-to-face world. In the online
world, can a negotiator convey the same degree of commitment using a text-
based website that he or she could convey in a face-to-face setting? Opinions
differ on this matter. In the online world, a negotiator may have an easier time
118. Commitment is a very important concept in negotiation theory. Schelling, for example,
maintains that a negotiator's ability to persuade an opponent that he or she is firmly committed to a
particular course of action is the key to success in negotiations. SCHELLING, supra note 63, at 21-
52.
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restricting an opposing negotiator's attempt to convey commitment. For
example, a party could shut off or limit communication from the opposing party
or claim that messages sent by the other side have not been received. It may be
easier for Party A to reject a proposal by Party B when Party B is at a distant
location and uses the Internet to send the proposal to Party A than it would be in
a face-to-face setting. Online communication may hinder Party A's ability to
convey commitment to Party B; however, it also improves Party A's ability to
thwart Party B's attempt to establish its commitment to a particular position. In
this sense, ODR may improve a negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Hypothesis 3a. When the dispute originates online, ODR procedures will have a
major positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 3a. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to resist attempts by an
opposing negotiator to establish commitment to particular positions.
Using ODR to resolve disputes that originate offline is likely to require
revision of Hypothesis 3a. Having current or previous interactions with the other
side may weaken the negotiator's capacity to hold off the other side's penetration
of the "line of defense" buffered by cyberspace. Therefore, we believe that
offline origination of a dispute will have a minor positive effect on a negotiator's
distributive bargaining responsibilities.
Hypothesis 3b. When the dispute originates offline, ODR procedures will have a
minor positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her distributive
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale3b. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to resist attempts by an
opposing negotiator to establish commitment to particular positions, but the
existence of a pre-existing relationship and channels of communication temper this
effect.
C. Integrative Bargaining Hypotheses
We noted earlier that integrative bargaining requires a negotiator to seek all the
possible joint gains in a bargaining situation. The tactics associated with
integrative bargaining include open communication, sharing information, joint
problem solving, and cooperation. To what extent does ODR hinder or facilitate
the use of integrative tactics?
Once again, the answer depends on whether one views online communication
as more "impersonal" than face-to-face communication. The absence of face-to-
face negotiations may make it more difficult for the parties to sustain an open and
cooperative relationship. Open and cooperative relationships often require a
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great deal of mutual trust, and limiting communications between the parties to an
online environment could inhibit the fostering of mutual trust.' 19 Therefore, we
hypothesize that, insofar as this dimension of integrative bargaining is concerned,
use of ODR for the resolution of online disputes will have a major negative effect
on a negotiator's ability to meet his or her integrative bargaining responsibilities.
If a dispute originates offline but is then submitted to an ODR provider, what
effect does ODR have on integrative bargaining? If the parties had an open and
cooperative relationship before turning to ODR, then our assertion that ODR will
have a major negative effect on integrative bargaining is likely to be mitigated.
However, if the parties had an adversarial and hostile relationship before turning
to ODR, then the use of ODR may accentuate the difficulty of engaging in
integrative bargaining. Given this ambiguity about the origin of a dispute, we
offer the following joint hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. When the dispute originates either online or offline, ODR procedures
will have a major negative effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or her
integrative bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 4. ODR impairs the negotiator's ability to foster and maintain an open
and cooperative relationship.
We acknowledge that ODR does provide disputing parties with some powerful
tools to enhance their integrative bargaining capabilities. Integrative bargaining
is fueled by the sharing, exchange, and processing of information. One of the
hallmarks of ODR is its technological sophistication, which facilitates the ability
of individuals to transmit and process information. Improving the flow of
information should enhance the parties' ability to find innovative solutions to
their problems and thereby maximize their joint gains. In this sense, ODR can
improve a negotiator's ability to meet his or her integrative bargaining
responsibilities. Once again, there is ambiguity about the effect of the origin of
the dispute, so we will formulate a hypothesis that deals with both online and
offline disputes.
Hypothesis 5. When the dispute originates either online or offline, ODR procedures
will have a major positive effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or her
integrative bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 5. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to share and process
information.
D. Attitudinal Structuring Hypotheses
In many respects, attitudinal structuring is the subprocess that some people
think most directly exposes ODR's Achilles' heel-structuring and managing
119. KATSH &RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 85-87.
Fall 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 38 U. Tol. L. Rev. 79 2006-2007
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
relationships between the parties. Earlier we noted that ODR proponents dispute
the claim that it is ill-equipped to handle interpersonal relationships. How does
ODR affect a negotiator's ability to manage the relationship between the parties?
Mutual trust is one of the central elements of a stable and productive
bargaining relationship. If it is a negotiator's objective to manage the
relationship between the parties in a fashion that fosters trust, then the absence of
face-to-face communication may hinder a negotiator's ability to achieve that
objective. We acknowledge that technological advances may diminish barriers to
the establishment of intimate relationships in the online world. Currently, we
contend that the absence of face-to-face interactions makes it difficult to execute
the delicate and subtle maneuvers necessary to structure a cooperative
relationship. Thus, with regard to the development and preservation of trust and
goodwill between the disputing parties, ODR will hinder the negotiators' ability
to achieve this objective. As with integrative bargaining, we believe that it is
difficult to hypothesize about the effect of a dispute that originates offline as
compared to one that originates online. A preexisting positive relationship may
moderate the negative effect of ODR, but a preexisting negative relationship may
accentuate it. We therefore propose the following joint hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. When the dispute originates either online or offline, ODR procedures
will have a major negative effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or attitudinal
structuring responsibilities.
Rationale 6. ODR impairs the negotiator's ability to structure and maintain a
trusting relationship with the other party.
As discussed earlier, Walton and McKersie emphasize that a negotiator may
not necessarily want to structure positive attitudes between the parties.
Attitudinal structuring is not solely a function of fostering a trusting relationship
between the parties. This process is, to a large extent, an instrumental one and it
entails a great deal of impression management. Because Walton and McKersie
do not view trust and cooperation as an end in itself, they maintain that the
negotiator must structure the relationship in the manner best suited to achieving
integrative or distributive objectives. ODR has a unique capacity for improving
the negotiator's ability to control the flow of information and create ambiguities
for the other side. Similarly, it is proposed that ODR, especially when disputes
originate offline, can enhance the negotiator's ability to manage the other side's
impression and, therefore, manage attitudes in an instrumental fashion. ODR,
even in its most advanced technological forms, provides the parties with an
additional buffer. In some situations this buffer serves to impede the resolution
process; however, a buffer can benefit the management of the other side's image
of the negotiator and his or her party. One of the negotiator's attitudinal
structuring responsibilities is to elicit the other party's belief in his or her side's
legitimacy. It may be easier to appear legitimate over time when provided with
additional "demilitarized" space within which to maneuver. Furthermore, there
are situations in which the negotiator's goals and objectives are not in line with
the facilitation of trusting and cooperative attitudes but with adversarial ones.
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Therefore, we hypothesize that when the dispute originates online, ODR has a
major positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her attitudinal
structuring responsibilities.
Hypothesis 7a. When the dispute originates online, ODR procedures will have a
major positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or attitudinal structuring
responsibilities.
Rational 7a. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to structure and manage the
other party's attitudes.
Hypothesis 7a rests on the assumption that the negotiator has the ability to
keep a tight grip on the information, messages, and images that are conveyed to
the other party. In the case of disputes that originate online, this assumption is
stronger. When the origin of the dispute is offline, it may be more difficult for
the negotiator to restructure the other party's existing beliefs and attitudes and to
restrict the flow of information. Thus, the negotiator's ability to manipulate the
process of attitudinal structuring in his or her favor is not as pronounced in such
cases. We therefore hypothesize that if the origin of the dispute is offline, then
this factor will moderate the positive effect we have suggested in Hypothesis 7a.
Hypothesis 7b. When the dispute originates online, ODR procedures will have a
minor positive effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or attitudinal structuring
responsibilities.
Rationale 7b. ODR improves the negotiator's ability to structure and manage the
other party's attitudes, but preexisting relationships and channels of communication
temper this effect.
E. Intraorganizational Bargaining Hypotheses
In our discussion of intraorganizational bargaining, we noted that this sub-
process requires that a negotiator assume two distinct responsibilities. First, the
negotiator must align the members of his or her own negotiating team and his or
her other constituents. Second, the negotiator must assess the degree to which
his or her counterpart has achieved such an alignment of interests. In many
cases, the negotiator is interested in subduing internal conflict on his or her side
while attempting to sow the seeds of conflict on the other side.
Since the first responsibility is primarily a function of interactions and
communications between the negotiator and his or her negotiations team or
constituents, it is likely that the use of ODR does not alter or influence this
process. The negotiator may use ODR to negotiate with the opposing team, but
this fact has little or no bearing on how his or her team operates internally.
Therefore, we hypothesize that with regard to the attainment of the
intraorganizational alignment of interests, the use of ODR will have no effect on
the negotiator's ability to meet his or her intraorganizational bargaining
responsibilities.
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Hypothesis 8. When the dispute originates either online or offline, ODR procedures
will have no affect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her intraorganizational
bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 8. Managing the internal dynamics on the negotiator's team is not
influenced by the mechanism used to negotiate with the opposing party.
With regard to a negotiator's responsibility to understand and influence the
internal alignment of the opposing party, we propose that use of ODR will have a
negative effect. Cyberspace's added barrier between the parties simultaneously
serves to protect a negotiator from unwanted intrusions into his or her strategic
territory; it also hinders the negotiator's ability to penetrate behind the other
party's line of defense. Assessing the opposing party's intraorganizational
alignment and internal conflict is inhibited by the use of ODR, especially for
disputes that originate online. Therefore, we hypothesize that the use of ODR
will have a major negative effect on a negotiator's ability to meet his or her
intraorganizational bargaining responsibilities in regard to influencing and
understanding the other party's internal alignment.
Hypothesis 9a. When the dispute originates online, ODR procedures will have a
major negative effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her
intraorganizational bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 9a. ODR impairs the negotiator's ability to gather information on the
state of the other party's intraorganizational alignment and internal conflict.
Finally, we hypothesize that a dispute that originates offline will moderate the
negative effect the use of ODR has on the negotiator's ability to understand the
degree to which an opposing party has achieved alignment. If the parties have a
preexisting relationship, then a negotiator should have some indication of the
internal dynamics of the opposing party. However, we continue to maintain that
without the face-to-face interactions between the negotiating teams it will be
more difficult for a negotiator to keep abreast of the opposing party's
intraorganizational bargaining issues and dynamics.
Hypothesis 9b. When the dispute originates offline, ODR procedures will have a
minor negative effect on the negotiator's ability to meet his or her
intraorganizational bargaining responsibilities.
Rationale 9b. ODR impairs the negotiator's ability to gather information on the
opposing party's intraorganizational alignment and internal conflict, but preexisting
relationships and channels of communication temper this effect.
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F. Testing the Application of Bargaining and Negotiation Theory to ODR
We have argued for the need to use theory to build models and formulate
hypotheses that can be used in ODR research. We have focused on the
application of bargaining and negotiation theory, a body of theory that has
special relevance for ODR. We have developed specific hypotheses that can be
tested by careful research. Of course, we have not conducted the empirical
research necessary to support or refute our hypotheses, but it is reasonable for the
reader to wonder how we would design a project that could do so. We offer here
only a handful of suggestions, which are based on standard methodologies used
by social scientists.
One approach that is commonly used by social psychologists in testing
negotiation theory is to use volunteer subjects in controlled experiments
conducted in laboratory settings.120 At Cornell, we can recruit students enrolled
in the courses that we and other colleagues teach on collective bargaining,
negotiation, and dispute resolution. We estimate that we would need to include
between fifty and one hundred students in our experiment. We would then have
half of the students engage in a face-to-face simulation and half in an online
simulation. The experience gathered through ICODR would be very valuable in
helping us to design our experiment. Both the cases used in ICODR and the
web-based platform might be adopted for our research project. Students would
attempt to resolve the case using basically the same tools that are currently used
in the competition. Students in the face-to-face simulation, using the same case
as students in the online simulation, would attempt to negotiate a resolution by
conventional means.
In general, the criteria used to evaluate student negotiations in ICODR could
be used in our research project, but they would have to be revised and refined to
reflect the hypotheses we have formulated. Using standard statistical techniques,
we would compare the performance of students in the face-to-face simulation
with the performance of students in the online simulation. If we have conducted
our experiment carefully, we would have results that either confirm or refute the
hypotheses.
What we have described would seem to be a relatively easy experiment to
conduct. However, there are a number of methodological complications that
make the task more challenging. We want to do our best to achieve equivalency
in the online and face-to-face simulations. For example, we might give students
in both situations the same amount of time to finish the exercise. However, is an
hour spent in face-to-face negotiations truly equivalent to an hour spent in online
negotiations? Most experts would argue that they are not equivalent.
We could also use of qualitative methodologies in our research design. For
example, researchers could select a handful of disputes to be resolved online;
through the use of interviews and participant observations, they could conduct in-
depth case studies as an initial exploratory stage of theory development.
Focusing on a limited number of cases could assist in determining the intricacies
120. For a general discussion regarding laboratory experiments and social research, see EARL
BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 237-59 (6th ed. 1992).
Fall 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 38 U. Tol. L. Rev. 83 2006-2007
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
and nuances of using ODR.121 Researchers could select cases that differ on a
number of key parameters, such as the origin of the dispute or the nature of the
issue in the dispute. By following each of the disputes throughout the process,
researchers could get a particularly good sense of the implications ODR use has
for the procedural elements of the dispute resolution process. These data can be
compared to existing empirical research on negotiations in the offline realm.
Finally, researchers could make use of archival data of ODR providers. The
dominant ODR sites, such as SquareTrade and Cybersettle, report that they have
handled extremely high numbers of cases. 122 With a data set this large, there is
inevitable variation across many of the important dimensions discussed in this
article. While these data would pertain solely to online resolutions and would not
allow for a comparison with offline dispute resolution outcomes, such variation
would allow for interesting statistical inferences, some of which could address
elements of the hypotheses developed above. In particular, using website
archival data could allow for an examination of the differences associated with
the online or offline origination of a dispute. Thus, statistical analysis using
these data could help assess the effects that different ODR characteristics have on
resolution outcomes.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: APPLYING OTHER THEORIES
OF NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING TO ODR
In conclusion, we want to note that a vast number of theories, concepts, and
principles exist in the literature on negotiation and bargaining that might be
applied to the study of online dispute resolution. We would like to discuss
briefly three additional concepts in negotiation theory.
A. Principled Negotiations
Earlier we noted that Fisher and Ury prescribe an alternative approach to
negotiations that they call interest-based bargaining or principled negotiation.
They list the four "methods" of principled negotiation: (1) "separate the people
from the problem"; (2) "focus on interests, not positions"; ,3 "invent options for
mutual gain"; and (4) "insist on using objective criteria."' 2 The concepts and
methods of interest-based bargaining have been incorporated into countless
college courses and training programs, and there are many practitioners who
maintain that the Fisher and Ury approach is superior to more conventional
methods of negotiating. There has been no research to date that tests the validity
121. For a discussion regarding the "process of inducting theory using case studies," see
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theory from Case Study Research, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 532
(1989).
122. For a review of the number of cases handled by some of the leading ODR providers, see
Tyler, supra note 51. For example, SquareTrade and Cybersettle are said to have handled over 1.5
million cases and 90,000 cases, respectively. Id.
123. FISHER & URY, supra note 63, at 15 (discussing the four methods of principled
negotiation).
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of Fisher and Ury's approach in the online world. Surprisingly, there has also
been very little empirical research on the validity of principled negotiation in the
conventional face-to-face arena.12 4  Following Fisher and Ury's advice, if
disputants focused on their underlying "needs, hopes, fears, or desires,' 25 rather
than on their "positions," would it be easier for them to achieve "wise [outcomes]
reached efficiently and amicably"? 126 We simply do not know the answer to this
question in face-to-face interactions, let alone online interactions.
B. Framing
Sociologists and social psychologists have also made significant contributions
to our understanding of negotiations. 27  One concept that researchers have
contributed to negotiation theory is "framing."' 128 According to Lewicki et al., "A
frame is the subjective mechanism through which people evaluate and make
sense out of situations, leading them to pursue or avoid subsequent actions.' 29
In practical terms, social psychologists have taught us that the precise way in
which a proposal (or counterproposal) is worded and presented influences the
probability that the opposing party will accept it.
There is a large body of empirical research on framing in negotiations; most of
this research has been conducted in controlled laboratory settings, using students
as subjects. The research indicates that when a proposal focuses on the gains it
yields for the opposing party, rather than the losses, it has a higher probability of
124. One scholar who has conducted empirical studies of interest-based bargaining is Joel
Cutcher-Gershenfeld. See, e.g., Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., In Whose Interest? A First Look at
National Survey Data on Interest-Based Bargaining in Labor Relations, 40 INDUS. REL. 1 (2001).
See also Cutcher-Gershenfeld, supra note 86. Cutcher-Gershenfeld analyzed data from a survey of
union and management negotiators who had used the U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service and discovered that the negotiators who had used interest-based bargaining reported that
they believed it had improved their collective bargaining relationship. Id. at 159.
125. FISHER & URY, supra note 63, at 45.
126. ld. at 4.
127. For a good summary of this research, see LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 132-82.
Significant contributions in this realm were made by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Of
their many articles, see, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124 (1974). Behavioral economics is a
branch of economics that incorporates the insights and research of social psychologists in
explaining economic phenomena. Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics, even
though he is a psychologist, because of the influence his research has had on behavioral economics.
128. Their ideas and concepts are too numerous to summarize here, but include the importance
of "heuristics" or rules of thumb in negotiations (time constraints require negotiators to use rules of
thumb in negotiations, but these rules of thumb are frequently incorrect and lead to faulty
decisions), the Winner's Curse (in many transactions buyers overestimate the value of what they
are buying, and pay more than the item is worth in objective terms), and the "endowment effect" (a
negotiator who owns an object will require a higher price to sell it than he or she would be willing
to pay for the same object if he or she were the buyer). See, e.g., BAZERMAN &NEALE, supra note
63. But see MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005)
(disagreeing with the proposition that rules of thumb lead to faulty decisions).
129. LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 135.
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being accepted. "If you couch your proposal in terms of your opponents'
potential gain, you can induce them to assume a positive frame of reference and
thus make them more likely to make concessions."1 30 Once again, no research
has been conducted on the influence of framing on negotiation and dispute
resolution in the online world, and, to our knowledge, no empirical research has
been conducted on any of the other concepts developed by social psychologists.
C. Bargaining Power
The leading experts in ODR have recognized the significant role that power
plays in negotiation and dispute resolution. For example, Katsh and Rifkin,
reflecting on their experience with the Online Ombuds Office at the University of
Massachusetts, note that one of the first lessons they learned was that "power
imbalances on the Web may be different from what they would be if the parties
were interacting offline." " 3  Katsh and Rifkin assert that the power differentials
that may exist in the physical world may be significantly diminished, or even
reversed, in the online world. 32 Rule has a different perspective when discussing
disputes between businesses and consumers. He notes that in both the online and
the physical world, businesses often have an advantage because they are likely to
have more experience using dispute resolution procedures than individual
consumers; businesses are more likely to be "repeat players" than consumers. If
experience gives businesses greater knowledge than consumers typically possess,
then a power differential favoring business is likely to exist. Resolving disputes
online may only widen the power differential because businesses can be expected
to have more technological expertise than consumers. "A process that appears
fair through one or two uses may have built into it a systemic bias in favor of
business interests that no one consumer can see but that becomes obvious over
time."' 13
3
Some scholars of employment relations believe that the repeat-player effect
may exist in that arena as well. Bingham has conducted several empirical studies
of the repeat-player effect in employment arbitration. In one study, she found
that employers who made repeated use of arbitration won the great majority of
their cases, while employers who used arbitration only once tended to lose those
cases. In employment arbitration, repeat players are likely to be employers, not
employees. Accordingly, Bingham argues that employment arbitration may be
biased in favor of employers. We simply do not know whether arbitrating
employment disputes online exacerbates or diminishes the repeat-player effect.
130. BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 63, at 40.
131. KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 15, at 80.
132. Id.
133. COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS 112 (2002).
134. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat-Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 189 (1997). See also Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the
Use of Statistics and Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 222 (1998).
Bingham's research is highly controversial and has been criticized on methodological grounds.
See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for
Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1570-77 (2005). In another empirical study of
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TO WARD AN INTEGRATED ODR MODEL
The need for empirical research on the effect of ODR on the power differential
between the disputants is quite obvious. It would be helpful if researchers
conducting such studies in the future grounded their work in theories of
bargaining power. Sociologists have recognized that bargaining power is an
elusive and multifaceted concept. Most scholars of power maintain that the
notion that experience and knowledge are the roots of bargaining power is only a
part of the story. 135  There are in fact competing definitions and theories of
bargaining power and a vast amount of literature on the topic.'
36
One definition of bargaining power is the ability of Party A to persuade Party
B to do what Party A wants, even if Party B is not inclined to do so. A well-
regarded theory of power in social interactions, initially posited by Emerson and
later more fully developed by Bacharach and Lawler, is the "power-dependence"
theory. This theory holds that Party A's power is a function of the extent to
which Party B is dependent on Party A. For example, parents have bargaining
power with their children because their children are often dependent on their
parents for both financial and nonfinancial support. This dependence gives
parents the power to convince their children to do what the parents wish. All
parents intuitively know that when their children become teenagers and are less
dependent, parents lose considerable power. As Lawler and Bacharach point out,
a counterintuitive paradox is that bargaining power is based on "giving" and not
on "taking." To the extent that Party A gives benefits to Party B that Party B
values, Party A can increase Party B's dependence and Party A's corresponding
power.137
Does ODR change the power-dependence relationship? If, for example,
parents and children resolve their differences online, rather than face to face,
does that alter the dependence of children on their parents? If so, does it increase
or decrease their dependence? What effect does this change in power have on the
ability of parents and children to resolve their differences? More generally, does
ODR alter the power equation between disputants, and if it does, what effect does
that alteration have on dispute resolution? We might imagine that Katsh and
Rifkin would argue that ODR fundamentally changes power relationships, but
Rule would maintain that it does not. To date, there is no data-based empirical
study on these propositions.
employment arbitration cases, researcher Elizabeth Hill found no evidence of a repeat-player effect.
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the
Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777, 805-10
(2003).
135. As Schelling says, if bargaining power implies "that it is an advantage to be more
intelligent or more skilled in debate, or to have more financial resources, more physical strength,
more military potency, or more ability to withstand losses, then the term does a disservice."
SCHELLING, supra note 63, at 22.
136. See, e.g., DEUTSCH, supra note 63, at 84-93; Emerson, supra note 63, at 31-40; French &
Raven, supra note 63, at 150-65; BACHARACH & LAWLER, supra note 63, at 41-79; LEWICKI ET AL.,
supra note 63, at 183-203. For a standard source on the topic, see generally JEFFREY PFEFFER,
MANAGING WITH POWER: POLITICS AND INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS (1992).
137. See generally Edward J. Lawler & Samuel B. Bacharach, Power Dependence in Collective
Bargaining, in 3 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 191 (David B. Lipsky & David
Lewin eds., 1986).
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We hope that our discussion of the application of bargaining and negotiation
theory to ODR has stimulated the reader to think of how other theories might be
applied to this important and growing phenomenon. We have done our best to
engage in a positive, nonjudgmental analysis of the influence of negotiation
theory on ODR. In closing, we would like to express some of our own opinions.
It should be obvious that ODR is here to stay and will only grow in significance
in the future. In his best-selling book, The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell
examines how an innovative social phenomenon, after a period of maturation,
can be rapidly diffused.138 We believe a tipping point has been reached in the use
of ODR. The pioneers in the study of ODR have done an admirable job of
advancing our understanding of this emerging form of dispute resolution. The
time is ripe for researchers to build on the foundations erected by the pioneers
and integrate theory and rigorous empirical testing into the research conducted on
ODR.
138. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000).
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